Thursday, December 4, 2008

game theory in poker

I'd definitely recommend reading The Theory of Poker (TP), by David Sklansky. It has some really great concepts that can serve you well up to the higher levels (at least, I've been using it with apparent success in 100NL). Note that a lot of the same basic concepts can apply to limit and no-limit, but you must modify their use in each one -- for example, the free card play. One of the most important chapters in my opinion in TP is chapter 19, on bluffing and game theory. It shows how you can construct a non-exploitable strategy for betting. Basically, it boils down to picking a bluffing frequency f, where bluffing occurs at random, then laying your opponent odds when you bet so that they get 1/f-1 to 1 odds on a call. For example, let's say you're tight-aggressive and raise only about 10% of your hands, and generally create heads-up situations on the flop against a loose opponent who's generally dominated by your range. Then let's say you always continuation bet, and that when you do so, 75% of the time your hand is good, e.g., overpair, set or top pair good kicker, and 25% of the time you brick the flop or are up against a set, etc. Then the non-exploitable strategy is to c-bet 1/2 of the pot, which lays your opponent 3-to-1 odds on a call. However, since he's a 3-to-1 dog to have the best hand, there's no simple way he can adjust his folding frequency to exploit you. Even looking at the board may not help, since by assumption, he's often dominated (so if the flop is K-high, you might have AK or TT, and your opponent holding K4 can't tell since you bet no matter what the flop is). Clearly, if he always folds, you always win money, whereas if he always calls, you two break even (ignoring rake).

Of course, just because it's non-exploitable doesn't mean it yields the highest winrate. However, this provides a baseline or starting point where you can start making adjustments to exploit the weaknesses of your opponents.

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